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presently encountered would have been obviated, for they were specifically
covered. The Hickman decision, however, was necessarily mute since these
problems were" not before that Court. If the 1946 amendment is not in accord
with present judicial thought, another proposition expressing the exact scope
and application of the privilege should be adopted. It is interesting to note
that at least two states have adopted the proposed amendment as part of
their discovery rules.'3 As the matter presently stands, there is a good deal
more confusion than is desirable or necessary in a purely procedural area.
"EX POST FACTO" ZONG
I. INTRODUCTION
When a municipality amends a zoning ordinance, thereby forbidding a pre-
%iously lawful land use, problems are created both for the municipality and
the landowner. While existing uses or completed buildings are usually held
immune from such a subsequent prohibition,1 a question arises as to the effect
of the change upon a party who has applied for or received a building permit.
Can the municipality enforce the amending ordinance retroactively and in-
validate the pending application or newly issued permit?
In many cases where the municipal zoning board denies a landowner's ap-
plication for a permit, it will do so prior to the effective date of the amending
ordinance and will base its decision upon the pendency of the new ordinance.
This so-called retroactive application of the ordinance is further complicated by
the fact that by the time the case gets to court the amending ordinance has
usually taken effect and the judge is faced with the problem of maling a decree
contrary to existing law. A similar complication is encountered where the amend-
ing ordinance takes effect between the decision of the trial court and the sub-
sequent appeal by the municipality.
The above situations are shallow in at least one respect, to wit, they pre-
suppose good faith on all sides. When a landowner is fully apprized of a pending
change in a zoning ordinance and still makes a last-ditch effort to obtain a
permit before the new ordinance takes effect, the problem takes on a new aspect.
On the other hand, a municipality, by the exercise of delay, misdirection, deceit
and discrimination can zone a landowner's property into oblivion. The same
basic problems arise even after the landowner has been issued his permit. How
strong a bulwark is this permit to the ravages of an amending ordinance for-
bidding the very use which the landowner intended?
It is generally held that the constitutional prohibitions against legislation in
126. See, e.g., N.J. Rules 3:26-2; Utah Rules 30(b).
1. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55-48 (1960); 1llage of Aill Neck v. Nolan, 233 App.
Div. 24S, 251 N.Y. Supp. 533 (2d Dep't 1931) (per curiam) (dictum); Canberg v. Kicinert,
225 App. Div. 875, 232 N.Y. Supp. 640 (2d Dep't 1929) (memorandum decdion) (dictum);
Pidcchio v. Board of Appeals, 165 Misc. 156, 300 N.Y. Supp. 363 (Sup. CL 1937).
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the nature of ex post facto laws are restricted to criminal statutes. 2 This leaves
unanswered the question whether such a restriction relegates to an unprotected
position a landowner caught in a period of transition and development with re-
spect to the retroactive effect of a subsequent zoning ordinance.
II. VESTED RIGHTS
In the field of zoning law the question of vested rights constantly arises. In
the absence of such a right a landowner has, in many cases, no protection against
a zoning amendment. But how is a vested right acquired?
A. With a Permit
In general, to acquire a vested right once a permit has been issued, the land-
owner must commence some substantial construction upon his land.3 "Sub-
stantial construction" requires at least grading, excavation and the installation
of a preliminary foundation with the necessary piping. 4 In Wheat v. Barrett,
however, a California court refused to find a vested right even though it was
established that the contractor had excavated and installed forms for a concrete
foundation before the zoning amendment was passed.
A less rigorous rule has been applied in some states. For example, Washington
would find a vested right upon application for the permit, if the permit is sub-
sequently issued.6 Other decisions which have found vested rights upon the
mere issuance of the permit, however, involved some bad faith on the part of
the municipality. Such is the case in Pennsylvania, but note, there many of the
opinions added that the permit would have been irrevocable regardless of the
good or bad faith of the municipality.7 In fact, one decision expressly exempted
from its protection a landowner who secured an eleventh-hour permit with full
knowledge of the pending ordinance.8 Thus, Pennsylvania might well go as far
as the Washington courts but with the added proviso that the injured landowner
exercise good faith. It is submitted that the distinction is an equitable and a
valid one, since the municipality is also entitled to protection from the courts.
A New Jersey case, Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio,9 may represent a different and
more equitable approach than that previously taken in that state.'0 Although
2. See, e.g., United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
3. See, e.g., Elsinore Property Owners Ass'n v. Morwand Homes, Inc., 286 App. Div. 1105,
146 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't 1955) (memorandum decision); Miller v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d
975 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd mem., 1 App. Div. 2d 975, 150 N.Y.S.2d 845 (2d Dep't 1956);
Pelham View Apartments, Inc. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
4. See Deer Park Civic Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N.E.2d 823 (1952).
S. 210 Cal. 193, 290 Pac. 1033 (1930).
6. See Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958).
7. See Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960); Shapiro v. Zoning Bd., 377
Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954); Lower Merion Township v. Frankel, 358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900
(1948).
8. Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. at 229, 157 A.2d at 371.
9. 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960).
10. See, e.g., following the general rule, Koplin v. Village of South Orange, 4 N.J. Misc.
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the case may be distinguished because the court found bad faith on the part of
the municipality, nevertheless it did state that "reliance" is ultimately deter-
mined by the fairness of the situation.1 1 The concept of "substantial reliance,"
borrowed from contract law, would be a more desirable guide since it would
protect the landowner who has in good faith expended large sums of money in
buying and preparing a plot of land, but who has not laid enough bricks to
satisfy the immovable guidelines of a court of review.
B. Without a Permit
"Vested rights" are predicated upon and acquired as a result of the land-
owner's own action. A case involving vested rights is to be distinguished from
one where the landowner prevails only because of the misconduct of city
officials. In the latter situation, the only reason the landowner succeeds is be-
cause he has been unjustly prevented from acquiring any vested rights.
Where a permit is necessary under the law in existence when his application
is filed, it is impossible for a landowner to acquire a vested right without such
permit.1 Of course, if a landowner acquired immunity from a subsequent zoning
amendment upon his application for a permit, the application itself would
operate to create a vested right.1 3 Wisconsin courts have taken a middle ground
between the application and the permit, itself, for the landowner must also show
substantial expenditures in reliance on his application.'4
MI. ZONIMG Am-,MN NT PRIOR To Tnxm
A. Generally
One trend of thought, apparently a majority view, is exemplified by cases in
New Jersey which favor the municipality over the individual landowner.1" In
New Jersey, this can be explained in part by the state constitution which
provides for liberal construction of a zoning law in order to effectuate the
purpose for which it was passed.10 The general rule in this state, therefore, is
that the municipality has every right to wipe away pending applications in order
to effectively apply the new ordinance to the problems that it is designed to
alleviate.
4S9, 142 Ati. 235 (Sup. Ct. 192S) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 105 N.J.L. 492, 144 At. 920
(Ct. Err. & App. 1929).
11. 32 N.J. at 457, 161 A.2d at 245.
12. See notes 15-34 infra.
13. See notes 35-49 infra.
14. See State ex rel. Schroedel v. Pagels, 257 Wis. 376, 43 N.W2d 349 (1950).
15. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Townmship of Blount Holly, 135 N.J.,. 112, 51
A.2d 19 (Sup. CL 1947) ; Krugman v. Municipal Council, 136 N.J.L. 32, 53 A.2d E03 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); Burmore Co. v. Champion, 124 N.J.L. 54S, 12 A.2d 713 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940);
Eastern Blvd. Corp. v. Wllaredt, 123 N.J.L. 269, S A.2d 6SS (CL Err. & App. 1939); Marron
& Co. v. TovnAhip of River Vale, 54 N.J. Super. 64, 14S A.2d 205 (App. Div. 1959);
Builders' Constr. Co. v. Daly, 10 N.J. Arljsc. S61, 161 AtI. 1S9 (Sup. CL 1932) (per curiam);
Rohrs v. Zabriskie, 102 N.J.L. 473, 133 AtL 65 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
16. N.J. Const. art. IV, § 6, para. 2.
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In the landmark case of Rohrs v. Zabriskie,17 a landowner applied for a
permit to build an apartment house. The building plans made no provision for,
and local law did not require, fireproofing. The municipality refused to issue
the permit, and before the landowner could bring his case to court, it passed an
ordinance forbidding nonfireproof apartments. On application of the landowner
to the supreme court' 8 for relief, it was held that prohibitions against retro-
active zoning did not apply where actual construction on the property had not
begun. 19 However, the court continued stressing the fact that the apartment
house would have been a threat to the public safety and, therefore, it would
have been an abuse of the power of a court of equity to sanction such a
menace 2 0
A later case, Builders' Constr. Co. v. Daly,21 dealt with a municipal set-back
requirement of twenty-four feet. After the landowner had applied for a permit,
this requirement was changed to forty-nine feet, thereby rendering impossible
the landowner's contemplated use of the property as a housing development.
In refusing the landowner's application for a writ of mandamus, the supreme
court, citing Rohrs, held that it must apply existing law.2"
A final case, indicative of this trend, is Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Township
of Mount Holly.23 While placing great reliance on the fact that the landowner
knew of the pending ordinance when he made his application, the court never-
theless restated the general rule:
[T]here can no longer be any question as of the time when the status of the ap-
plicable law controls. It is neither the status of the law prevailing at the time of
the application for the permit nor the status of the law prevailing at the time of
the . . . allowance of the rule to show cause. It is the status of the law prevailing
at the time of the decision by the court that is controlling.
24
This rule has been adopted in New York.25 In Rodelli v. Burns,20 where the
zoning amendment was passed one day before the supreme court's review of
the matter, the court applied the amending ordinance and dismissed the land-
owner's petition.
17. 102 N.J.L. 473, 133 Ad. 65 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
18. In New Jersey the Supreme Court was formerly a trial court. However, by the
constitution of 1947, that appellation was given to the highest court in the state. N.J. Const.
art. VI.
19. 102 N.J.L. at 475, 133 At]. at 65.
20. Ibid.
21. 10 N.J. Misc. 861, 161 At. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (per curiam).
22. Id. at 864, 161 At. at 191.
23. 135 N.J.L. 112, 51 A.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
24. Id. at 117, 51 A.2d at 23.
25. See, e.g., Rodelli v. Burns, 19 Misc. 2d 562, 187 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Suffolk Pines, Inc. v. Harwood, 14 Misc. 2d 826, 178 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Ap-
plication of Kunz, 128 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Maxwell v. Klaess, 192 Misc. 939, 82
N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
26. 19 Misc. 2d 562, 187 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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This reasoning also has been followed in California,2 7 Florida, 3 Georgia,
Illinois30 and Texas.- In Ward v. Village of E! mwood Par.,3 2 an Illinois court
held that in the absence of a showing of a substantial change of position in re-
liance thereon, the landowner had no vested rights in the continuation of an old
ordinance.33 Similarly, a Georgia court has flatly stated that such action by a
municipality cannot be considered unconstitutional as legislation in the nature
of ex post facto laws.3-1
It would be presumptuous, however, to call the above-mentioned views uni-
versal. Contrary decisions exist even in the jurisdictions noted. Two New Jersey
decisions are patently inconsistent with the general rule.3 In Vine v. Zabriskier0
the court refused to consider a new ordinance and issued a writ of mandamus
compelling the municipality to issue a permit. It was held that the amendment
was an eleventh-hour attempt to prevent this relator from using her property for
its highest use.. .. Such action vas ill-advised, capricious and unreasonable. ....
[AV]e are satisfied that the result was an arbitrary interference with the lawful and
legitimate use of private property. 37
The New York Court of Appeals has also held that the mere fact that an
ordinance was pending would not justify a town board's denial of a permit
where the ordinance was still pending at the time of the appellate decision.P
However, even in this case when the question came up for rehearing, the pend-
ing ordinance had become law and, therefore, the appellate division was con-
strained to hold that in the absence of vested rights, even though the landowner
was entitled to a permit, it was rendered valueless by the new ordinance.O
The courts of Florida40 and Illinois41 have also rendered decisions refusing
27. See Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 Pac. 4S7 (1923).
23. See Daidson v. City of Coral Gables, 119 So. 2d 7C4 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 19G0)
(per curiam).
29. See Gay v. Mayor, 212 Ga. 43S, 93 S.E.2d 352 (1956).
30. See Ward v. llage of Elmwood Park, 3 M. App. 2d 37, 130 N.E.2d 237 (1933).
31. See Mc Eachern -. Town of Highland Park, 123 Te.m 4S0, 73 S.W.2d 4S7 (1934).
32. 8 Ii1. App. 2d 37, 130 N.E.2d 2S7 (1955).
33. Id. at 39, 130 N.E.2d at 28S.
34. Gay v. Mayor, 212 Ga. 43S, 439, 93 S.E.2d 352, 353 (1956).
35. See Sgromolo v. City of Asbury Park, 134 NJ.L. 195, 46 A.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Xine v. Zabriskie, 122 N.J.L. 4, 3 A.2d SS6 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
36. 122 NJ.L. 4, 3 A.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
37. Id. at 6, 3 A.2d at S87. Similarly in the Asbury Park case the court found that:
"It . . . beggars understanding why the permit was refused. Relator's right to the lawful
use of his property... may not be denied him.... [Tlhe zoning ordinance has no applica-
tion. For here there was a full compliance vith the building code before the zoning ordinance
was adopted. It was therefore the peremptory duty of the building inspctor to L ue the
permit in question." Sgromolo v. City of Asbury Park, 134 NJ.L. at 197-93, 46 A.2d at 6-?.
38. Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 266 N.Y. 460, 195 N.E. 154 (1934) (memorandum
decision).
39. 246 App. Div. 555, 282 N.Y. Supp. 916 (2d Dep't 1935) (memorandum decion).
40. See Broach v. Young, 100 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1958); Harris v. State ex rl. Wcoter,
139 Fla. 195, 31 So. 2d 264 (1947).
41. See Rubin v. City of Rockford, 296 Il. App. 650, 16 N.E.2d 607 (1933).
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to apply a supervening zoning amendment so as to invalidate a permit ap-
plication, valid when made. Likewise, in reversing a trial court's application
of an amending ordinance, a California court reasoned that
at the time the applications were made and denied, there existed no authority either
by ordinance or statute permitting . . . the building inspector, to refuse to issue the
license. . . . [I]t being conceded that the then existing statutory requirements had
been complied with, the petitioners were entitled to an issuance of the building
permits. The trial court was therefore in error . . . in undertaking to require . . .
a compliance with . . . this [amending] ordinance .... 42
Agreeing with this latter view, and in direct conflict with the prevailing
view, the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the issuance of a permit was
governed by the law as it existed at the time of application and not by an
amendment passed while the landowner's application was pending.43 It was
found that:
"A municipal council may not, by the enactment of an emergency ordinance, give
retroactive effect to a pending zoning ordinance thus depriving a property owner of
his right to a building permit in accordance with a zoning ordinance in effect at
the time of the application for such permit . . . ." [I]t is established that under
the police power the use of land ... may be regulated .... However, once regula-
tions have been established, and so long as such regulations are in force, the state
and its subdivisions are as much bound as the people to abide by such regulations.
In other words, laws bind the state as well as the people. 44
It should be noted that although the Ohio Constitution prohibits the enactment
of retroactive laws,45 this fact was not discussed in this case.
A similar constitutional provision was applied to uphold a landowner's right
to a permit in contravention of an amending ordinance in City & County of
Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc.40 In a separate opinion, however, it was indicated
that the court's decision would probably be the same regardless of the special
constitutional provision.
Even if we were not so bound [by the constitution] . . . only in the rarest of
instances could a zoning authority be justified under the police power in denying a
permit under existing law while a new ordinance or an amendment . . . is being
drafted and adopted .... [I]t is palpably unjust ... to say that an owner who has
spent large sums on plans and specifications, in reliance on the law as it is, should
forfeit his rights and what he has spent . . . for the public good without just com-
pensation. . . . [I]n all cases, except in case of an actual crisis in public health,
42. McCombs v. Larson, 176 Cal. App. 2d 105, 109, 1 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142-43 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
43. Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960). See also State
ex rel. Del Monte v. Woodmansee, 72 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
44. Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. at 4-5, 167 N.E.2d at 653-54.
45. Ohio Const. art. II, § 28.
46. 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
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morals or safety, builders should have the right to rely upon the law as it is, not
what some public official thinks it should or will be... in the future.A7
Comparable decisions have been reached in Indiana"3 and Tennessee s
B. Knowledge of Zoning Amcndwcnt
'Where a landowner's application for a permit is denied on the basis of an
ordinance passed subsequent to his application, there are a few cases in which
the determination was based on the fact that when the landowner applied he
was fully aware of the pending ordinance.Go The reasoning here seems quite
plausible, i.e., where a town is undertaking a plan of rezoning for the public
good, its plans should not be thwarted by the connivance of an individual who,
with full knowledge of the situation, attempts to outrun the town board to the
courthouse and thereby establish a foothold in the maintenance of a use which
has been adjudged contrary to the public good. Of course, for this reasoning to
be legitimate, it must appear that the pending ordinance was introduced in
good faith and was actually destined for passage into law.
C. Improper Act of the Municipal Authorities
Where municipal authorities act in bad faith, as for example where an ap-
plication is unreasonably refused or delayed until an amendment can be
effected, the general rule, and that most compatible with principles of equity,
would ignore the amendment and apply the law as of the time of the land-
owner's application.
WhMile it is generally true that such an application must conform to an ordinance
passed while action upon the same is pending . . . that rule seems not applicable
to a situation in which the permit dearly should have been issued before amend-
ment to the law.51
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park Ridge,0 2 although the landowner
did not claim a vested right, he asserted that the city authorities had acted so
improperly and arbitrarily that he was prevented from acquiring such a right.
In holding that the amending ordinance was inapplicable to the landowner's
application, the court found that it would be inequitable to allow the city to
benefit from its own wrongdoing. The court reasoned that the landowner's lack
of a vested right was immaterial where the city's arbitrary action was the only
basis for his lack of such a right.
47. Id. at 165, 347 P.2d at 943 (separate opinion).
4S. Knutson v. State ex rel. Seberger, 239 Ind. 656, 160 N.E.2d 2M0 (1959).
49. State ex rel. Morris v. City of Nashville, 207 Tenn. 672, 343 S.W.2d 347 (1961).
50. See, e.g., Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160
N.E.2d 697 (1959); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Township of Mlount Holly, 135 N.J.. 112,
51 A.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Rosenzweig v. Crinnion, 139 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. CL 1954).
51. Mlunns v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 551, 314 P.2d 67, 73 (Dist. CL App. 1957).
52. 16 Ill. App. 2d 555, 149 N.E.2d 344 (1953).
53. The rule was stated thus: "The rights of the parties crystallized at the time when
the permit was applied for and was improperly withheld. To hold otherwise would he to
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A recent Florida decision concerning an application for a liquor license, while
holding on its facts that a subsequent amendment was applicable, set forth, in
dictum, the general view as follows:
[I]n a suit involving an application for issuance of a . . . license, the law as it
stands at the time of the decree, rather than at the time of application or the filing
of the suit, controls the decision thereon .... The exception is that when the officials
... to whom an application ... has been made.., act arbitrarily to avoid their duty,
such as by undue delay . . . or by passing new limitations . . . designed to avoid
having to issue the license and to circumvent an impending court decision which
would direct its issuance, the court may disregard the new . . . regulation thus
enacted by the officials . . . or which has been passed after their undue delay.
5
'
On the other hand, the courts of New Jersey, even in a situation such as this,
remain adamant in their stand behind the municipality. In Roselle v. Mayoro
the landowner secured a writ of mandamus commanding the town to issue him
a permit. The town thereupon ignored the order and proceeded to amend its
ordinance to forbid the intended use. On final disposition of the case the appel-
late division, affirming its prior finding that the town officials were in contempt
for their disobedience of the trial court's decree, 50 nonetheless denied the land-
owner his permit. The court went even further in admitting that although the
town might be guilty of "maladroit" acts, 5 7 it would still uphold the result.
If one is not confused by the holdings in this area, he has only to look to
the decisions in New York. In Dubow v. Ross,"8 the appellate division purported
to set forth the prevailing rule that where city officials wilfully refuse to give a
landowner his permit and further mislead and hinder him so that he cannot
acquire a vested right before the new ordinance becomes effective, the ordinance
is inapplicable to the landowner. In other words, the court suggested that
where the malfeasance of city officials is the only reason for the landowner's
failure to acquire a vested right before the amending ordinance takes effect, the
necessity for such a right is waived and he is held immune from the intervening
ordinance. This theory has been followed in Harris v. Coffey," where the court
stated:
It is the duty of an administrative official to perform the functions of his office
promptly and in accordance with the law as it presently exists. He may not refuse
to act because of the possibility that the law may be modified at some future
time .... It is most improper to assume or anticipate .... 00
give the city, without statutory authority, a right to suspend a zoning ordinance." Id. at
566, 149 N.E.2d at 350.
54. Davidson v. City of Coral Gables, 119 So. 2d 704, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
55. 49 N.J. Super. 35, 139 A.2d 42 (App. Div. 1958).
56. For the earlier opinion in which the town was found to have been properly held
guilty of contempt, see Roselle v. Mayor, 48 N.J. Super. 17, 25, 136 A.2d 773, 777 (App.
Div. 1957).
57. 49 N.J. Super. at 42, 139 A.2d at 46.
58. 254 App. Div. 706, 3 N.Y.S.2d 862 (2d Dep't 1938) (memorandum decision).
59. 14 Misc. 2d 916, 179 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
60. Id. at 918, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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The case was then remanded for a full hearing with instructions that the land-
owner be issued his permit if it were found that he could have acquired a vested
right but for the wrongful act of the town officials.
This theory, however, was apparently contradicted in Whittakcr v. Burns.0'
There the supreme court failed to find any proof of unreasonable delay by the
town board. Nevertheless, it went on to say as dictum that even if wilful conduct
were proven, the landowner would not be entitled to a permit, since its issuance
was a matter of discretion6 2 A later case, Rodclli v. Burns,'O followed the Whit-
taker reasoning, but made a distinction of sorts, stating that while the fact of
unreasonable delay by the town board was immaterial, the court's finding might
have been different if actual deception was found to have been practiced upon
the landowner. c A recent decision put the entire issue in doubt by proposing
that the rule of Dubow be limited to the extent that for a landowner to prevail,
he must show not only a wilful delay by the town officials, but also that he
had acquired a vested right 0
Some of the cases, therefore, would seem to draw a distinction between
unreasonable delay on the one hand, and hindrance or deception on the other.
However, as a practical matter, this distinction seems imaginary. An intentional
delay by a public senant in issuing a building permit could certainly be found
to be in the nature of deception or hindrance.
D. Application of One Landowncr
Even where municipal authorities are galvanized into action by the applica-
tion of one particular landowner, the courts of New Jersey sustain the amend-
ing ordinance. While earlier decisions recognized the evils of such an action, cg
Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs0 7 stated the prevailing New Jersey
view:
Plaintiffs argue . , . that the ordinance must be struck down because . . . it was
hurriedly adopted for [the] specific purpose of preventing . . . [the landowmer]
from carrying out its known plan to construct the apartment building.... Mani-
festly the ordinance would not be invalid merely because . . . the... [landovmer's]
action gave incentive to its passage.r s
This rationale, apparently peculiar to New Jersey, has been followed in sub-
sequent cases.0 9
61. 13 Misc. 2d 233, 176 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 195S).
62. Id. at 235, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
63. 19 MNisc. 2d 562, 1S7 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. CL 1959).
64. Id. at 563, 1S7 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
65. Gramatan Hills Manor, Inc. v. Mlanganiello, 30 Misc. 2d 117, 213 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup.
CL 1961).
66. See, e.g., Ridgefield Terrace Realt- Co. v. Borough of Ridgefield, 136 XJ.L. 311, 5S
A.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Brovn v. Terhune, 125 NJ.. 618, 1 A.d 73 (Sup. CL 1941).
67. 11 1.j. Super. 405, 7S A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1951).
68. Id. at 415, 73 A.2d at 440.
69. See, e.g., 'Marron & Co. v. Township of River Vale, 54 N.J. Super. 64, 75, 143 A.2d
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Ordinances such as that in Guaclides are in the nature of special legislation
and have in other states been held inapplicable to the aggrieved landowner.
In Munns v. Stenman,70 a California court found strong evidence of arbitrary
and discriminatory action where the "emergency" requiring the amendment
was the plaintiff's application for a permit. Another California court has stated
that:
Nothing ... indicates that ... [the town] had ... contemplated the ordinance
before the trial court's ... decision; the enactment of the ordinance stemmed from
the county's attempt to frustrate respondent's plans. . . "Such an isolation of one
party as the object of the Board's legislative action is a plain discrimination; one
that cannot survive testing under accepted principles of constitutional law." 71
A recent Florida decision also followed this rationale. 72
E. Summary
It is submitted that when a town carries out a contemplated zoning amend-
ment it should be authorized to revoke pending applications for uses incon-
sistent with the proposed change. Since the purpose of zoning legislation is to
improve public welfare, a municipality should be given wide latitude in im-
plementing its laws so that it can achieve the beneficial result intended. Where
this can be done without prejudice to the vested rights of an individual, the
preservation of which is fundamental to our system of jurisprudence, the court
should not apply imaginary distinctions to thwart the intended benefit to the
common good. However, where evidence of bad faith on the part of the
municipality is discovered, the courts should preserve for the individual those
privileges which would have been his but for the unjust act of the municipal
authorities.
IV. ZONING AMENDMENT SUBSEQUENT TO TRIAL BUT PRIOR TO APPEAL
A. Generally
Where the law has been changed subsequent to trial but prior to appeal,
the rule stated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Schooner
Peggy7 3 usually controls.
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to inquire
whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if, subsequent to the
judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation
205, 212 (App. Div. 1959); Crecca v. Nucera, 52 N.J. Super. 279, 284, 145 A.2d 477, 479
(App. Div. 1958); Roselle v. Mayor, 49 N.J. Super. 35, 40, 139 A.2d 42, 45 (App. Dlv.
1958).
70. 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 314 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
71. Sunset View Cemetery Ass'n v. Kraintz, 196 Cal. App. 2d 115, 123-24, 16 Cal. Rptr.
317, 322-23 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
72. Davidson v. City of Coral Gables, 119 So. 2d 704, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(dictum).
73. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
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denied.... It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will
and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective
operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns, where indi-
vidual rights are sacrificed for national purposes the sacrifice ought always
to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import .... In such a case
the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside
a judgment, rightful when renedered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation
of law, the judgment must be set aside.74
From this precedent decisions have gone divers ways. As a result there has
been a conflict of authority not only among the several states, but even in the
decisions of courts of the same state. The majority rule, totally ignoring Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall's requirement of "great national concerns," applies the
new law to all cases wherein a change of law has taken place prior to the deci-
sion on appeal.75 With regard to permits in particular, it is generally held that:
A change in the law between a nisi prius and an appellate decision requires the
appellate court to apply the changed law .... A fortiori, a change of law pending
an administrative hearing must be followed in relation to permits for future acts.
Otherwise the administrative body would issue orders contrary to the existing legis-
lation.76
The minority view, on the other hand, strictly interprets the Chief Justice's
words and nullifies the Peggy holding in the vast majority of situations, The
reasoning behind this theory is that:
Neither can we . . . send the case back to the court below, with instructions to
enter a ... nonsuit, because since the judgment below, and while this writ of error
has been pending, the statute authorizing the action has been repealed. A writ of
error to this court does not vacate the judgment below. That continues in force
until reversed, which is only done when errors are found ... on which it rests, and
which were committed previous to its rendition.7 s
B. Zoning in Particukr
A change of law prior to an appeal has been comparatively rare in zoning
cases. Where it has occurred the courts have almost invariably followed the
74. Id. at 109. (Emphasis added.)
75. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) (per curiam); Board of
Educ. v. Brittin, 11 Ill. 2d 411, 143 N.E.2d 555 (1957); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United
Elec. Workers, 139 NJ. Eq. 97, 49 A.2d S96 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Fruhling v. Amal-
gamated Housing Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 541, 175 N.E.2d 156, 215 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1961); In re
Stickney, 1S5 N.Y. 107, 77 N.E. 993 (1906) (per curiam).
76. Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943).
77. See, e.g., Hatheway v. Barnhart, 12 Ill. App. 2d 433, 139 N.E2d 862 (1957); Cole v.
Fall Brook Coal Co., 159 N.Y. 59, 53 N.E. 670 (1899) ; Ball Motors, Inc. v. Orange County
Trust Co., S App. Div. 2d 937, 190 N.Y.S.2d 533 (2d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
78. Railway Co. v. Twombly, 100 U.S. 7S, 81 (1879). To properly evaluate the holdings
on this point would require an exhaustive study of this separate field of the law. For a
collection of cases on both sides, see Annot., 111 AL.R. 1317 (1937).
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majority view expressed above.79 An exception is permitted, again, where bad
faith is found on the part of the municipality. In such a case, the appellate
courts have applied the law as it existed at the time of the trial regardless of
the subsequent amendment.80 This principle is really a projection of the rule in
the case where the amendment comes before the trial.
V. ZONING AMENDMENT CAUSING REvOcATION OF ISSUED PERMIT
A. Generally
As a general rule, the mere issuance of a permit to a landowner will not, per
se, preclude a subsequent revocation by an amending ordinance forbidding the
landowner's intended use. As against a subsequent zoning amendment the
permit is worthless unless the landowner has acquired a "vested right" under
and in reliance upon such permit.81
This rule, however, is not universal. In Hull v. Hunt,8 2 a Washington court,
recognizing the existence of widespread authority to the contrary, reasoned:
Notwithstanding the weight of authority, we prefer to have a date certain upon
which the right vests to construct in accordance with the building permit. We prefer
not to adopt a rule which forces the court to search through . . ."the moves and
countermoves of ... parties ...by way of passing ordinances and bringing actions
for injunctions"--to which may be added the stalling or acceleration of admin-
istrative action in the issuance of permits-to find that date upon which the sub-
stantial change of position is made which finally vests the right. The more practical
rule to administer, we feel, is that the right vests when the party ...applies for
his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued.83
In Sharrow v. City of Dania,8 4 a Florida court denied the property owner
relief because of his knowledge, at the time he procured the permit, of the
pending ordinance. The court, however, added the qualification, "if it were not
for this fact [plaintiff's knowledge], we might find an area for the application
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in ... [plaintiff's] favor. With such fore-
warning, however, the doctrine cannot be applied." s5 Thus, reliance on the
79. See Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 Pac. 1033 (1930); Roselle v. Mayor, 49
N.J. Super. 35, 139 A.2d 42 (App. Div. 1958) (by implication); Crecca v. Nucera, 52 N.J.
Super. 279, 145 A.2d 477 (App. Div. 1958); Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 266 N.Y. 460,
195 N.E. 154 (1934) (memorandum decision); Dengeles v. Young, 3 App. Div. 2d 758, 160
N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision).
80. See Sunset View Cemetery Ass'n v. Kraintz, 196 Cal. App. 2d 115, 16 Cal. Rptr. 317
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 16 Ill. App. 2d 555,
149 N.E.2d 344 (1958); Lened Homes, Inc. v. Department of Licenses & Inspections, 386
Pa. 50, 123 A.2d 406 (1956).
81. See, e.g., Fairchild Sons, Inc. v. Rogers, 266 N.Y. 460, 195 N.E. 154 (1934) (memo-
randum decision); Williams v. Village of Deer Park, 78 Ohio App. 231, 69 N.E.2d 536
(1946); In re Hertrick, 391 Pa. 148, 153, 137 A.2d 310, 314 (1958) (dictum).
82. 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958).
83. Id. at 130, 331 P.2d at 859.
84. 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955).
85. Id. at 275.
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part of the injured party must be shown for an estoppel to operate Since in
this case there was no "vested right" in the plaintiff, it would follow that the
reliance necessary would be less than that needed for the acquisition of a
"vested right."
B. Action of Municipal Athorities
In Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio,8 7 a New Jersey landowner, after having re-
ceived its permit, was lulled into inaction by the false representations of the
mayor of the town. As a result, before it had acted in any substantial manner
upon its permit, the landowner was caught unawares by a zoning amendment.
The trial court granted the landowner's petition for relief and the appellate
division reversed, basing its decision upon the general New Jersey rule favoring
the municipalityss However, on appeal, in a decision which may have far
reaching implications, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding the
ordinance invalid as to the plaintiff. The court stated that a permit may not
be revoked by a zoning amendment after the landowner's reliance thereon.
Reliance, it was suggested, is really a matter of balancing the interests of the
partiesS It is interesting to note that the supreme court expressly refused to
consider what the result might have been had an application rather than a
permit been involved.0° Whether this case presages a modification of the
strong view heretofore taken by New Jersey courts remains to be seen.
A similar result was reached in Wasilcuski v. Biedrzycki,91 where a Wis-
consin court stated that "the subsequent amendment cannot affect defendant's
right [to build] ... [which] accrued under valid laws, and [which] ...but
for this action would probably have been .. .completed before the amend-
ment . .. "9 A Pennsylvania court, in Shapiro v. Zoning Bd.,03 applied the
same rule and also found that the ordinance had been aimed directly at plain-
tiff's permit. The court stated that "if a permit cannot rightfully be refused
in the first instance, it cannot be arbitrarily revoked after issuance. .... ,3
S6. See, e.g., Byrne v. Barrett, 263 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935); Firt Nat'l Bank v.
Starke Design, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 595, 200 N.Y.S.2d 703 (3d Dep't 1960) (memorandum
decision).
87. 32 N.J. 44S, 161 A.2d 241 (1960).
SS. 55 N.J. Super. 320, 150 A.2d 799 (App. Div. 1959).
89. 32 N.J. at 457, 161 A.2d at 245.
90. Id. at 455, 161 A.2d at 244.
91. ISO Ms. 633, 192 N.W. 9S9 (1923).
92. Id. at 638, 192 N.W. at 991.
93. 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
94. Id. at 629, 105 A.2d at 303. A similar result was reached in Yocum v. Power, 393 Pa.
223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960). The court felt that, "as nothing can be more unjust in criminal
law than an ex post facto law, so nothing is more frowned on in civil law than a procedure
which has the effect of making illegal what the law has already rccognized as legal" 393




It is doubtful whether judicial precedent or legislative action can solve all of
the problems of "ex post facto" zoning. To achieve a maximum of fairness, how-
ever, the legislature can prescribe more specific guidelines.
This end has been achieved to a limited extent by a recent New York statute
which provides for the exemption from an amending ordinance of lots shown
on an approved subdivision plat. Where such lots are planned and subdivided
for residential use, providing for at least one street therein, and these plans
are approved by the town board, the lots specified are thereby rendered immune
from a subsequent ordinance which seeks to enlarge the minimum lot area or
set-back requirement.95 By passing such a law, the New York Legislature has
furnished protection to a commercial builder in a limited situation. Whether
this indicates a trend in the granting of further protection to the landowner
is a matter for conjecture.
A broader protection was given by the ordinance before the court in In-
spector of Bldgs. v. Nelson96 which provided that upon its passage:
Nothing herein shall require any change in the plans, construction, or intended use
of a building for which unexpired approval has heretofore been issued, and the
construction of which shall be completed according to such approval within one
year from the date when this by-law goes into effect. 97
A Massachusetts statute immunizes a permit from revocation by a subsequent
zoning amendment if the permit is issued before the landowner has notice of
the proposed amendment.9 8
Legislation of this type requires at least the issuance of a permit. It would
seem, however, that the spirit of these laws could be extended to cover ap-
plications for permits. In such a case, the emphasis might be placed upon
95. N.Y. Gen. City Law § 83-a; N.Y. Town Law § 265-a; N.Y. Village Law § 179(2).
All three statutes provide: "[T]he provisions of a zoning ordinance hereafter adopted, and
the provisions of [an amendment thereto] . . . which ... establish or increase lot areas, lot
dimensions which are greater than ... the lot areas ... or dimensions of the lots shown and
delineated on a subdivision plat of land into lots for residential use and which said sub-
division plat also shows and delineates one or more new streets . . . and which said sub-
division plat has been duly approved by the . .. board . .. of the [city, town or village]
... and duly filed in the office of the recording officer . . . or which provisions establish or
increase side, rear or front yard or set back requirements in excess of those applicable to
building plats under the provision of the zoning ordinance . . . in force . . . at the time of
the filing of the said subdivision plat, shall not [for certain fixed times] . . . be applicable
to ... any of the lots shown and delineated on such subdivision plat."
96. 257 Mass. 346, 153 N.E. 798 (1926).
97. 257 Mass. at 348, 153 N.E. at 799. To the same effect was the ordinance in a
Louisiana case: "'[N]othing in this ordinance shall be construed as cancelling any permit
heretofore granted prior to the passage of this ordinance ... but the legal rights of such ...
owners shall be duly and legally preserved. ... '" City of Shreveport v. Dickason, 160 La. S63,
570-71, 107 So. 427, 430 (1926).
98. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, § 11 (1954).
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